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The European Union’s “Comprehensive Approach” in
Chad: Securitisation and/or Compartmentalisation?
JAN ORBIE and KAREN DEL BIONDO
The European Union (EU) aims for a comprehensive approach to security in developing
countries. As a result, attempts have been made to enhance the nexus between the EU’s
security policy and other policy areas, particularly development, humanitarian assist-
ance, and democratic governance. This article analyses the EU’s comprehensive approach
in the case of Chad, focusing on two questions. First, has the EU’s comprehensive
approach been able to supersede the compartmentalisation of the EU’s political system?
Second, has it led to the securitisation of non-security policy areas? These questions
are answered by investigating the nexus between the EU’s security, democracy, develop-
ment and humanitarian aid policies in Chad from 2006 onwards. This analysis conﬁrms
the compartmentalisation scenario, especially regarding development and humanitarian
aid where the relation with security policies was at times openly conﬂicting. While the
EU’s democracy promotion policies are found to be securitised, this is not the case for
development and humanitarian aid.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has the ambition to address security challenges by
taking a “comprehensive approach”. In several ofﬁcial communications, the EU
has underlined its commitment to human security.1 This should be seen in light
of the recognition that security and development are interrelated and that this
understanding of a security–development nexus should inform the EU’s policies.2
Institutionally, progress towards a “whole-of-government approach” has been
made in 2010 with the establishment of the European External Action Service
(EEAS) which brings together national diplomats, former Commission ofﬁcials
from the Directorates General of Development and External Relations and
*We are grateful to David Galbreath, Richard Whitman, Stefan Wolff, Julia Leininger, Mark Furness,
Annemarie Peen-Rodt, Laust Schouenborg, Maurizio Carbone, Olivia Rutazibwa, Christine Hackenesch,
and Mary Farrell for feedback on earlier versions of this article. All remaining errors are our own.
1. European Union, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” (Brussels: EU,
2008); Council of the EU, “Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States Meeting with the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission on Euro-
pean Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’” (Brussels: Council of the EU, 2006).
2. Council of the EU, “Council Conclusions on Security and Development” (Brussels: Council of the
EU, 2007).
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Council ofﬁcials.3 Increasingly, these new ways of understanding security issues
are informing the EU’s strategies towards developing regions, including the
Horn of Africa,4 the Great Lakes5 and the Sahel.6 In these strategies, the link
between security, development, humanitarian problems and democratic govern-
ance is central. Nonetheless, the 2013 Joint Communication by the European Com-
mission and the EEAS on a comprehensive approach to external conﬂicts and crises
hardly mentions democratic governance and humanitarian objectives.7
Has the EU lived up to these ambitions of a comprehensive approach to security?
The EU has strongly developed its capacities to strengthen the political systems of
developing countries. While the EU used to be a primarily economic actor (devel-
opment, trade), it has since the 1990s becomemore focused on democracy and good
governance. Since the 2000s, the EU has also strengthened its security and defence
policy and has deployed several European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mis-
sions on African soil. The EU’s agenda has certainly broadened, yet this ambition to
take a comprehensive approach to security raises two questions that arise from
existing studies. First, can the EU’s comprehensive approach supersede the compart-
mentalisation of the EU’s political system? The latter is known for its strong divisions
between the different foreign policy sub-sectors such as development (former “ﬁrst
pillar”) and security (former “second pillar”).8 Previous studies found this to be the
case for the EU’s trade, development, foreign policy and security policies.9
Increased coordination mechanisms within and between EU institutions are no
guarantee that the interplay between the different foreign policy subsystems
results in a coherent foreign policy.10 Second, as security policies become more
intertwined with other policies, could this lead to securitisation, where security
objectives overshadow other policy objectives? Many authors have warned that a
broader understanding of development may lead to a situationwhere development
is being compromised for security objectives. For example, parallels are drawn
between the current War on Terror and the Cold War era, when aid was being
3. Mark Furness, “WhoControls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU Exter-
nal Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013), pp. 103–125.
4. Council of the EU, “Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa” (Brussels: Council of the EU, 2011).
5. European Commission and EEAS, “A Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region, Joint Com-
munication to the Council” (Brussels: EU, 2013).
6. EEAS, “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel” (Brussels: EEAS, 2013), available:
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf> (accessed 19 May 2014).
7. European Commission and EEAS, “The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conﬂict and
Crises” (Brussels: EU, 2013).
8. Hylke Dijkstra, “Commission versus Council Secretariat: An Analysis of Bureaucratic Rivalry in
European Foreign Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2009), pp. 431–450.
9. Richard Youngs, “Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-Platitude?”, Journal of Euro-
pean Integration, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2008), pp. 419–437; Fernanda Faria and Richard Youngs, “European Con-
ﬂict Resolution Policies: Truncated Peace-building”, Working Paper No.94 (Madrid: FRIDE, 2010); Gorm
Rye Olsen, “TheMissing Link: EPAs, Security and Development Interventions in Africa”, in Gerrit Faber
and Jan Orbie (eds.), EU–Africa Relations in Transition (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 342–358;
Ole Elgström and Jess Pilegaard, “Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements”,
Journal of European Integration, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2008), pp. 363–380; Christian Bueger and Pascal Vennesson,
“Security, Development and the EU’s Development Policy” (Florence: European University Institute,
2009), available: <http://erd.eui.eu/media/vennesson2.pdf> (accessed 19 May 2014).
10. Sophie Vanhoonacker and Christine Neuhold, “Dynamics of Institutional Cooperation in the Euro-
pean Union: Dimensions and Effects”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2015), pp. 1–15.
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diverted to the allies of the West.11 Previous studies have suggested that the EU’s
development policies are increasingly becoming securitised.12
We aim to contribute to this literature by focusing on the nexus between security,
development, humanitarian aid and democracy in the EU’s policies in Chad. In this
way, we try to ﬁll two gaps in the literature. First, while there has been extensive
research on the link between security and development in EU policies,13 the
nexus between security and other policy areas, including democracy promotion
and humanitarian assistance is understudied. Second, studies on the securitisation
of EU development policies have mostly analysed EU documents and discourses,
development aid budgets, the EU’s institutional architecture, and tentative
examples,14 while empirical studies are lacking.
This article investigates the whole of EU policies in Chad from 2006 onwards
including diplomatic instruments (political dialogue, public statements, activities
by the EU special representative or Development Commissioner), ESDP missions,
humanitarian aid through the European Community Humanitarian Ofﬁce
(ECHO), Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) programmes,
and different development cooperation funds such as the European Development
Fund (EDF), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the European Instrument for Democ-
racy and Human Rights (EIDHR) as well as programming documents such as
Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs).
Chad is a relevant case to investigate the EU’s comprehensive approach as the
EU’s policies in Chad have covered diverse policy areas. The EU has implemented
a wide range of policies covering nearly all areas of EU competencies in external
relations in Chad.15 In 2007 the EU deployed the EU Force Chad/CAR in Chad
and the Central African Republic, the largest EU military mission so far. The EU
uses part of its development assistance to support the security sector and to
promote democratic governance. It has also provided a substantial amount of
humanitarian assistance to Chad, given the difﬁculties with refugees from Darfur
11. Roberto Picciotto, “Aid and Conﬂict: The Policy Coherence Challenge”, Conﬂict, Security & Develop-
ment, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2004), pp. 543–562; Jo Beall, Tom Goodfellow and James Putzel, “On the Discourse of
Terrorism, Security andDevelopment”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2006), pp. 51–67.
12. Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain and Joakim Öjendal, “Researching the Security-Development Nexus
through a Multi-Disciplinary Approach”, in Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain and Joakim Öjendal (eds.), The
Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conﬂict and Development (New York: Anthem Press, 2012), pp. 1–12;
Karen Del Biondo, Stefan Oltsch and Jan Orbie, “Security and Development in EU External Relations:
Converging, But inWhich Direction?”, in Sven Biscop and RichardWhitman (eds.),Handbook of European
Union Security (New York: Palgrave, 2012), pp. 126–142; Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner, “Europe’s New
Security Strategy: Challenges for Development Policy”, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17,
No. 3 (2005), pp. 423–436; Amelia Hadﬁeld, “Janus Advances? An Analysis of EC Development Policy
and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 12, No. 1
(2007), pp. 39–66.
13. Hadﬁeld, op. cit.; Faust and Messner, op. cit.
14. Youngs, op. cit.; Faria and Youngs, op. cit.; Mark Furness and Stefan Gänzle, “The European Union’s
Development Policy: A Balancing Act between ‘a More Comprehensive Approach’ and Creeping Secur-
itisation”, University of Agder ISLWorking Paper, No. 11, 22 November (Agder: University of Agder,
2012), available: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2184851>; Del Biondo, Oltsch
and Orbie, op. cit.; Stephan Keukeleire and Kolja Raube, “The Security–Development Nexus and Secur-
itization in the EU’s Policies Towards Developing Countries”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Vol. 26, No. 3 (2013), pp. 556–572.
15. Cees Wittebrood and Christophe Gadrey, “The European Union and Peacebuilding: The Case of
Chad”, in Steven Blockmans, Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys (eds.), The European Union and Peacebuilding
(The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2010), p. 252.
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and food insecurity. Moreover, Chad is a most-likely case for generalisation of the
securitisation scenario given the sheer size of the EU’s military mission and the
geostrategic importance of Chad (in particular for France that was heavily involved
in the military mission). However, as we will see in the paper, the securitisation
hypothesis was only conﬁrmed in the case of democratic governance and not in
the case of development and humanitarian aid. The potential for generalisation
is probably smaller in relation to the compartmentalisation scenario. Nevertheless,
it remains relevant to research whether the EU’s ambition of a comprehensive
approach has materialised in a case where a wide range of policies were deployed.
This study is based on a triangulation of sources of information. Desk researchwas
conducted of relevant ofﬁcial documents and available secondary literature. In
addition, 10 semi-structured interviews were held with ofﬁcials from the European
Commission16 and the EEAS, responsible for Chad during the period under investi-
gation, as well as experts in the area. The article is structured in two main sections.
The ﬁrst one explains the growing nexus between security and other areas in the
EU’s policies and formulates three likely scenarios of “securitisation”. The second
part investigates whether the EU’s policies in Chad since 2006/2007 are securitised.
From Human Security to Comprehensive Security
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing consensus in academic and policy-
making circles that security and development are inextricably linked, which is
often referred to as the “security–development nexus”.17 Such ideas have resonated
in the discourse of important international security providers and have led to a
growing convergence of development policies and conﬂict management.18 The
nexus between security and development derives from an evolution in the under-
standing of security. After the Second World War, security was mainly understood
as national security. Security policies, in this sense, had to secure the state frommili-
tary threats.19 However, this concept did not capture the growing importance of
non-military security issues with transnational characteristics, including environ-
mental threats, HIV/AIDS, the instability of the global ﬁnancial system, cross-
border population movements, and the spread of organised criminal trafﬁcking
of drugs, arms and persons.20 As a result, the international community began to
focus on people as the subjects of security. The term “human security” was ﬁrst
mentioned in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, entitled “New Dimen-
sions of Human Security”. Human security emphasises two dimensions of security:
freedom from fear (physical security/freedom from violence) and freedom from
want (basic needs).21 Covering these two major components, seven possible
16. Directorate General Development and Cooperation and ECHO.
17. Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, “Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conﬂict, Complex-
ity, Cacophony, Convergence”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2010), pp. 5–29.
18. Björn Hettne, “Development and Security: Origins and Future”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 41, No.1
(2010), pp. 31–52, at p. 34.
19. Bueger and Vennesson, op. cit.
20. Des Gasper and Thanh-Dam Truong, “Deepening Development Ethics: From Economism to
Human Development to Human Security”, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17, No. 3
(2005), pp. 372–384, at p. 373.
21. Des Gasper, “Securing Humanity: Situating ‘Human Security’ as Concept and Discourse”, Journal
of Human Development, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), pp. 221–245, at p. 225.
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threats to human security were listed : economic security, food security, health
security, environmental security, personal security, community security and politi-
cal security.22
In this context, the EU saw the opportunity to distinguish itself as an inter-
national security provider by taking a human security approach in its nascent
security policies. A study group concluded that “the most appropriate role for
Europe in the twenty-ﬁrst century would be to promote human security”.23 Sub-
sequently, key documents on EU development and security policies such as the
European Consensus on Development (2005), the follow-up of the European Secur-
ity Strategy (2008) and the latest revision of the Cotonou Agreement (2010) mention
human security as an explicit objective. In a 2008 report on the European Security
Strategy the EU states: “There cannot be sustainable development without peace
and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no
sustainable peace”. Furthermore, it adds that “human rights are a fundamental
part of the equation” and that conﬂict is often linked to state fragility and bad gov-
ernance.24 The 2013 Joint Communication on the EU’s comprehensive approach to
security builds on these declarations and sets out concrete steps to increase consist-
ency between the different areas of EU external action. However, while the com-
munication reiterates the reciprocate relationship between security and
development, it does not explicitly mention the nexus between security and demo-
cratic governance and humanitarian objectives.25
The move towards the security–development nexus has often been linked to the
concept of “securitisation” introduced by the Copenhagen School of security
studies.26 Securitisation means the process of presenting an issue in security
terms.27 Securitisation often implies a primacy of security, as “whether or not a
matter is perceived and declared a security concern not least determines and jus-
tiﬁes the measures behind it”.28 In this light, it should be mentioned that the
term “comprehensive approach” was already discussed in the early 2000s in
NATO, a military organisation with limited civilian capabilities. In 2010 NATO
integrated the concept in its strategic framework.29 The dominance of security con-
cerns is often justiﬁed by the belief that economic development is only possible in a
secure environment.30 However, the Copenhagen School is highly critical of
22. UNDP, “New Dimensions of Human Security. Human Development Report 1994″ (New York:
UNDP, 1994), pp. 24–33.
23. Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” (Barce-
lona: Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004), p. 29.
24. European Union, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” (Brussels:
European Union, 2008), p. 8.
25. EEAS, “The EU’s Comprehensive Approach”, op. cit., p. 4.
26. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (New York:
Lynne Rienner, 1998).
27. Keukeleire and Raube, op. cit., p. 557.
28. Carmen Gebhard and Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, “Making Sense of EU Comprehensive Security:
Towards Conceptual and Analytical Clarity”, European Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), pp. 221–241, at p.
227.
29. Cecilia Hull, “Focus and Convergence through a Comprehensive Approach: But Which Among
the Many?”, Paper from the 16th ICCRTSS conference, Québec, 21–23 June 2011, p. 6, available:
<http://www.dodccrp.org/events/16th_iccrts_2011/papers/088.pdf> (accessed 21 February 2015).
30. Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald, War and Underdevelopment: The Economic and Social Conse-
quences of Conﬂict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, “Poverty and Violent
Conﬂict: Rethinking Development”, in Necla Tschirgi, Michael Lund and Francesco Mancini (eds.),
The European Union’s “Comprehensive Approach” in Chad 5
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securitisation. The risk of such an approach is that there is more focus on the symp-
toms, rather than on the root causes of the problem.31 There is substantial evidence
that poverty and inequality cause feelings of grievance, which may lead to violent
conﬂict.32
Many analyses have suggested that EU development assistance is becoming
increasingly securitised. Authors often point to the European Security Strategy
(2003), which states that “Security is a precondition of development”.33 This “secur-
ity ﬁrst” logic represented a shift from earlier ofﬁcial EU documents, which focused
on poverty as a root cause of conﬂict.34 Evidence of securitisation can also be found
in the 2005 amendment of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the group
of African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc countries, which introduced paragraphs on
migration, the ﬁght against terrorism and conﬂict prevention.35 Furthermore, a
securitisation of EU development funds has been noticed. The African Peace Facil-
ity is the clearest example where budgets from the European Development Fund
are used for peacekeeping and peace enforcement.36 Moreover, EU aid seems to
be increasingly channelled to countries that are of strategic importance to the EU.37
Also in the realm of humanitarian aid, it has been increasingly recognised that
emergency assistance and security policy objectives cannot be separated.
However, in this area the nexus has been even more contested since humanitarian
aid should be provided on the basis of the principles of impartiality, neutrality and
non-discrimination. This a-political and needs-based approach is central to the
mandate of the EU’s humanitarian aid ofﬁce, DG ECHO. It is also emphasised in
the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (agreed in 2007) and in the
Lisbon Treaty (which has a separate Article 2014 on humanitarian aid). At the
same time, there have been attempts to address the “grey zone” between humani-
tarian aid and crisis management, for example through LRRD. The extent to which
this may have entailed a securitisation of humanitarian aid has barely been
researched. One study found that humanitarian aid was somewhat securitised in
the 1990s but that this has diminished since the early 2000s.38 Although the
Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections (New York: Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 17–45;
Alberto Alesina, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini and Phillip Swagel, “Political Instability and Economic
Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1996), pp. 189–211.
31. In relation to the EU see Ian Manners, “Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the cross-
roads”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 182–199.
32. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefﬂer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.
56, No. 4 (2004), pp. 563–595; Barnett Rubin, “Sources of Violent Conﬂict”, in David Carment and
Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Conﬂict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality: Opportunities and Innovations
(Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 21–40; Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal
Inequalities”, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2000), pp. 245–262.
33. European Union, “A Secure Europe in a BetterWorld: European Security Strategy” (Brussels: Euro-
pean Union, 2003), p. 2.
34. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on Conﬂict Prevention” (Brussels:
European Commission, 2001).
35. Hadﬁeld, op. cit.
36. Faria and Youngs, op. cit., p. 2; Keukeleire and Raube, op. cit.; Maurizio Carbone, “An Uneasy
Nexus: Development, Security and the EU’s African Peace Facility”, European Foreign Affairs Review,
Vol. 18, No. 4 (2013), pp. 103–124.
37. Del Biondo et al., op. cit.; Furness andGänzle, op. cit., pp. 19–22; Christian Aid, The Politics of Poverty.
Aid in the New Cold War (London: Christian Aid, 2004).
38. Helen Versluys, “European Union Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?”, in Jan Orbie
(ed.), Europe’s Global Role. External Policies of the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 107–108.
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Lisbon Treaty guarantees the humanitarian principles, non-governmental organis-
ations (NGOs) continue to warn that security priorities may hinder its neutrality
and impartiality.39 On the other hand, some studies suggest that cooperation
between the humanitarian and development spheres of the EU (respectively DG
ECHO and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Develop-
ment [DG DEVCO]/EuropeAid) remains difﬁcult to achieve.40 Whereas the inde-
pendence of humanitarian aid has not been affected, also the desired cooperation
between humanitarian and development policy has not been put in practice
beyond some pilot projects.41
Security objectives may trump the EU’s goals to promote democratic governance.
Authoritarian regimes are often tolerated when they are able to provide political
stability and exercise effective control over the entire territory.42 Donors may be
reluctant to impose rapid democratisation on conﬂict-prone countries, as this
may provoke instability.43 However, research into the causes of conﬂict has
argued that the absence of political rights and exclusion of certain groups in the
political process lead to grievances, which may result in rebellions.44 The EU has
often supported authoritarian governments as long as they are internally stable
and have a stabilising effect on neighbouring countries.45 In fragile states or
post-conﬂict countries the EU has focused on peaceful rather than on democratic
elections (e.g. Nigeria, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo). Again, such
an approach risks focusing only on short-term solutions while ignoring potential
root causes of insecurity. The European Commission has underlined the impor-
tance of addressing democratic governance and human rights as root causes of
structural stability.46 The European Security Strategy mentioned that: “The best
protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states”.47
In sum, the EU has increasingly recognised that security, development, humani-
tarian and democratic governance objectives should be geared to one another and
that therefore a comprehensive approach is required. While existing studies
39. Jan Orbie, Peter Van Elsuwege and Fabienne Bossuyt, “Humanitarian Aid as an Integral Part of the
European Union’s External Action: The Challenge of Reconciling Coherence and Independence”, Journal
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2014), pp. 158–165; VOICE, “VOICE Position on
Civil–Military Relations in Humanitarian Action” (Brussels: VOICE, 2009).
40. Pedro Morazán, François Grünewald, Irene Koke and Tobias Schäfer, “Strengthening the Link
between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the EU’s Financing Instruments for Develop-
ment and Humanitarian Aid under the MFF 2014-220” (Brussels: European Parliament, 2012), available:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/433783/EXPO-DEVE_ET(2012)
433783_EN.pdf>.
41. Orbie, Van Elsuwege and Bossuyt, op.cit., p. 162.
42. Barnett Rubin, op. cit., p. 32; Marta Reynal-Querol, “Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars”,
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2002), pp. 29–54, at p. 35.
43. Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract. How External Statebuilding
Reinforces Weak Statehood”, in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 31; Michael Barnett, “State Fragility, the Peacebuilder’s Contract, and
the Search for the Least Bad State”, RSCAS Working Paper, No. 14 (Florence: EUI, 2010), available:
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/13537>.
44. Collier and Hoefﬂer, op. cit.; Reynal-Querol, op. cit.
45. Michèle Knodt and Annette Jünemann, “Explaining EU Instruments and Strategies of EU Democ-
racy Promotion. Conclusions”, inMichèle Knodt and Annette Jünemann (eds.), European External Democ-
racy Promotion (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), pp. 353–369.
46. European Commission, “The European Union and the Issue of Conﬂicts in Africa: Peace-Building,
Conﬂict Prevention and Beyond” (Brussels: European Commission, 1996).
47. European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, op. cit., p. 10.
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suggest that security objectives tend to dominate EU policies, it has not yet been
investigated systematically how exactly security, development, democracy pro-
motion and humanitarian aid policies converge in a relevant country case. Such
a holistic analysis should also ask the question whether different policy areas
remain compartmentalised. As indicated above, part of the literature characterises
the EU’s external action as being the sum of different policies stemming from sep-
arate sub-systems with diverse objectives. Despite increasing attempts at coordi-
nation, the compartmentalised nature of the EU foreign policy system still often
entails incoherent outcomes. In the subsequent section we aim to examine the ques-
tions of securitisation and compartmentalisation more closely by looking at the
EU’s policies promoting security, democracy, development and humanitarian
objectives in Chad.
The EU in Chad
In this section, we will investigate the EU’s strategies to promote security, democ-
racy, development and humanitarian objectives in Chad. We will start by discuss-
ing problems regarding security, development, humanitarian issues and
democracy in Chad and how they are interrelated. We then focus on the EU’s
approach to addressing these issues in Chad, asking the question whether there
is compartmentalisation between different policy areas and whether the EU’s
approach has been securitised.
Security, Development, Humanitarian and Democracy Related Problems in Chad
Insecurity in Chad increased signiﬁcantly in the mid-2000s. Security problems
emerged from three main sources. First of all, there was a serious risk of a military
coup, which became clear after the attempted coup d’état in May 2004.48 Secondly,
many armed opposition groups responded to the political and economic crisis in
Chad.49 A ﬁrst attempt to take power was made in April 2006. In January 2008, a
coalition of rebels launched an attack on N’Djamena and nearly ousted Déby.
Thirdly, there is the spill-over of the conﬂict in Sudan. Many armed rebellions
were supported by Sudan, while President Déby actively supported the Justice
and Equality Movement in Darfur.50 In 2010, relations were normalised following
an agreement between Chad and Sudan. Both countries expelled rebel forces
from their respective territories.51 Furthermore, the conﬂict in Darfur caused an
inﬂux of Sudanese refugees and cross-border incursions of Sudanese militias,
including the Janjaweed. The Chadian army was unable and unwilling to protect
the camps and to address the impunity and banditry permeating the region.52
48. International Crisis Group, “Tchad: Vers le Retour de la Guerre” (Brussels/Nairobi : ICG, 2006),
p. 10.
49. International Crisis Group, “Chad: A New Conﬂict Resolution Framework” (Brussels: ICG, 2008),
pp. 12–13.
50. Roland Marchal, “Chad/Darfur: How Two Crises Merge”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol.
33, No. 109 (2006), pp. 467–482, at p. 473.
51. International Crisis Group, “Tchad: Au-delà de l’Apaisement” (Brussels : ICG, 2010), p. 2.
52. Marco Boggero, “Darfur and Chad: A Fragmented Ethnic Mosaic”, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2009), pp. 21–35, at p. 27; Oxfam, Action contre la Faim, Care and Cordaid, “IDPs
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Chad also faces a deeply ﬂawed democratisation process. Although multi-party
democracy was formally introduced in the early 1990s, subsequent elections have
been characterised by serious ﬂaws. After the 2001 elections, the results of which
were challenged by the opposition, most opposition parties declared they would
boycott all further polls organised by the regime.53 In this context, Déby won
most of the seats in the subsequent legislative elections (2002), managed to push
through a constitutional referendum that abolished the two-term limit on the presi-
dency (2005) andwon a third term in theMay 2006 elections.54 InAugust 2007, a pol-
itical agreement was reached between the non-armed opposition and the ruling
party, which paved the way for inclusive legislative elections. However, the deterio-
rated security situation after the January 2008 coup attempt caused a serious delay in
the implementation of the agreement. Amidst the turmoil caused by the uprising,
Déby declared a state of emergency, arrested three opposition members and tigh-
tened restrictions on the free press.55 Nonetheless, the implementation of the agree-
ment was continued, and in 2009, new electoral laws were adopted and an
independent electoral commission was created.56 Legislative elections were held
in February 2011 and were won by the presidential majority. Although the elections
were held in a relatively open sphere, the ruling party had a comparative advantage
over the opposition as it used state resources during the campaigning period.57 Pre-
sidential elections, held in April 2011, were again boycotted by opposition candi-
dates as their demands for electoral reform had not been met.
Lastly, Chad has also faced a socio-economic and humanitarian crisis. Despite
income from oil extraction coming in since 2002–2003, it remains one of the
poorest countries in the world. Chad ranked at the very bottom of the 2010
Human Development Index (HDI); only six countries scored worse. Its HDI
score deteriorated between 2005 and 2010. As a landlocked country with a desert
climate in the north, Chad (and particularly the Sahelian zone in central and
eastern Chad) is periodically affected by chronic food deﬁcits.58 Humanitarian pro-
blems were aggravated by the arrival of Sudanese refugees, which put a strain on
the already limited resources. More recently, refugee ﬂows from Libya in 2011 and
from the Central African Republic in 2013 have caused signiﬁcant humanitarian
problems. Moreover, from 2005 onwards, the government has shifted attention
away from poverty reduction because of the worsening security situation. The
most ﬂagrant example of this was the decision in 2005 to amend the Revenue Man-
agement Law, which provided that the bulk of oil revenues would go to poverty
reduction, to allow for an increase in security spending.59 The economy is
in Eastern Chad: Is It Time to Go Back Home?” (2009), available: <http://www.caringforkaela.org/ﬁles/
ﬁle/09_04_24%20NGO%20Chad%20Return%20paper.pdf> (accessed 19 May 2014).
53. International Crisis Group, “Chad: A New Conﬂict Resolution Framework”, op. cit., pp. 9–10.
54. Paul-Simon Handy, “Chad: Democratisation Challenges and Limits to International Intervention”,
ARI (Analyses of the Elcano Real Institute), No.59 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2008), pp. 4–5.
55. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2003” (New York: Freedom House, 2003).
56. International Crisis Group, “Tchad: Sortir du Piège Pétrolier” (Brussels : ICG, 2009).
57. European Union Election ObservationMission, “Mission d’Observation Electorale. Tchad. Rapport
Final. Elections Legislatives”, pp. 4–6, available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/rapport_
ﬁnal_moe_ue_tchad_270511_fr.pdf> (accessed 25 February 2015).
58. World Food Programme, “Chad Overview” (n.d.), available: <http://www.wfp.org/countries/
Chad/Overview> (accessed 19 May 2014).
59. Hans Eriksson and Björn Hagströmer, “Chad: Towards Democratisation or Petro-Dictatorship?”,
Discussion Paper, No. 29 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005), p. 45.
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further hampered by corruption: Chad ranked 171 of 178 countries in the 2010
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Chad is one of the
most difﬁcult countries in the world in which to start a business; in the World
Bank’s 2010 Doing Business Index, it ranked 178 out of 183 countries. According
to the Governance Indicators, government effectiveness has deteriorated signiﬁ-
cantly between the early 2000s and 2010.
An Increasingly Political Approach
Since the mid-2000s, the EU’s approach to Chad has become more political. A ﬁrst
indication of this evolution can be found in the NIPs, which also specify the EU
budget for Chad. The emphasis has shifted from purely socio-economic develop-
ment to security and democratisation. The NIP for 2002–2007 foresaw three focal
sectors: transport (41%), water (25%) and macroeconomic support (25%), while
good governance and institutional support represented only 9% of the aid
package.60 With the NIP for 2007–2013, however, good governance (and more
speciﬁcally support for justice, security forces, public ﬁnances, democratic insti-
tutions and decentralisation) was increased to about one-third of total
cooperation.61 The security situation in eastern Chad accelerated these efforts. In
2006, the UN contemplated the establishment of a multidimensional presence in
Chad and the Central African Republic. However, it soon became clear that Presi-
dent Débywas unwilling to accept such a force, given that it would be accompanied
by a programme on human rights and the rule of law. In this context, France pro-
posed EUFOR as a bridging operation for one year, after which the UN would
start its police mission MINURCAT (Mission des Nations Unies en République Centra-
friquaine et Tchad). The latter would try and broker amore long-term solution to inse-
curity in eastern Chad by training and advising elements of a special force to
provide security in the refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps, the
Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS).62 EUFOR’s formal mandate was to protect civi-
lians, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure safety of UN person-
nel.63 EUFOR became the largest military mission deployed by the EU in Africa,
with over 3,700 forces coming from 23 member states and three non-EU countries
in the period between 15 March 2008 and 17 September 2008. The total cost of the
mission is estimated at €1 billion.64 In addition to EUFOR, €38 million was invested
in the security sector in Chad. Of this, €10million came from the IfS andwas directly
invested in the MINURCAT police mission. The Programme d’appui à la réforme des
forces de sécurité intérieure (PAFSI, €13.5 million from the EDF) involves training
for the Police Nationale and for the DIS. The second part of the project (PAFSI II,
60. Tchad—Communauté Européenne, “Stratégie de cooperation et Programme Indicatif 2002-2007” ,
p. 28, available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tchad/documents/more_info/programme_indicatif_
national_9ieme_fed_fr.pdf> (accessed 25 February 2015).
61. Tchad—Communauté Européenne, op. cit., pp. 3–4.
62. Alexander Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations—The Case of EUFOR
Tchad/RCA”, IES Working Paper No.5 (Brussels: Institute of European Studies, 2008), pp. 8–9.
63. Tony Chafer, “Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo”, in Tony Chafer and
Gordon Cumming (eds.), From Rivalry to Partnership? New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2011), p. 79; Mattelaer, op. cit., p. 17.
64. David Styan, “EU Power and ArmedHumanitarianism in Africa: Evaluating ESDP in Chad”, Cam-
bridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2012), pp. 651 –668.
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€14.5 million from the EDF) is intended to support the Gendarmerie Nationale (GN)
and Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad (GNNT).65
The EUhas also come topay some attention to democratic governance.Democratic
governance was almost absent in the EU’s strategies in the period 2000–2006. Apart
from one small project on media freedom by the European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights (in 2002), no democracy assistance was provided in this period.
Only occasionally, the EU reacted publicly to problems on democracy and human
rights in the country, namely in the context of the 2001 and 2006presidential elections.
Moreover, there was no political dialogue in the context of Article 8 of the Cotonou
Agreement between the EU and Chad.66 After the 2006 elections, however, the EU
placed democratisation higher on its agenda in Chad. Via the German and French
embassies and the Commission delegation, the EU was the key facilitator of the
August 2007 agreement.67 The implementation of the agreement wasﬁnancially sup-
ported by the Programme d’appui à la réforme du système electoral au Tchad (PARSET, €5
million), which sponsored the creation of an electoral list and of an electoral commis-
sion, domestic observation by civil society, civic education and strengtheningpolitical
parties. In addition, €5 million of the IfS—the instrument par excellence for promoting
the security–development nexus—was committed to support the electoral census in
Chad.68Apart fromsupport to the electoralprocess, theEUalsoprovides a substantial
amount (€25million from the EDF) to the justice sector, via the Programme d’Appui à la
Justice au Tchad (PRAJUST). The shift towards a more political approach coincided
with a change of the Head of Delegation of the EU from Mr Cremeur (2001–2006)
who was more development oriented to Mr Desesquelles (2006–2011) who focused
more on political and security issues (interview 8, 11 May 2012).
The EU has also provided a massive amount of humanitarian aid to Chad, which
is one of the 17 “extremely vulnerable” countries or territories identiﬁed by the EU
on the basis of a needs assessment.69DGECHOhas been active in Chad since 2004.70
Most of ECHO’s assistance in this period was destined for refugees from Sudan and
the Central African Republic. From 2007 onwards, food assistance became more
prominent, particularly in the Sahel belt. The EU has also engaged in LRRD in
Chad. In 2011, ECHO also focused on humanitarian assistance for Chadians return-
ing from Libya. In 2014, the inﬂow of refugees from the Central African Republic
asked for an increase in ECHO’s efforts to meet the basic needs of those refugees.71
65. See European Commission, “Commission Decision of 18 December 2009 on the 2009 Annual
Action Programme for Chad to Be Financed from the 10th European Development Fund—Action
Fiches” (Brussels: European Commission, 2009); European Commission, “Commission Decision of 28/
07/2010 on an ad hoc Measure for Chad to Be Financed from the 10th European Development Fund
—Action Fiches” (Brussels: European Commission, 2010).
66. Interview 1, 19 March 2009; Interview 2, 23 January 2012; Interview 8, 11 May 2012.
67. Styan, op. cit., p. 666.
68. European Commission, “Annual Report from the European Commission on the Instrument for
Stability in 2008” (Brussels: European Commission, 2009), pp. 4–5.
69. European Commission, “Accompanying Document to the ‘Report from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament’. Annual Report on the Humanitarian Aid Policy and Its
Implementation in 2009” (Brussels: European Commission, 2010).
70. Morazán et al., op. cit.
71. European Commission, “Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Chad”, available: <http://ec.
europa.eu/echo/ﬁles/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/chad_en.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2014).
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The nexus between security, development, humanitarian aid and democracy promotion
policies
While the EU approach has become more political since the mid-2000s, involving
not just socio-economic development and humanitarian assistance but also demo-
cratic governance and security-related cooperation, the question remains how
these different policies relate to each other. In this section, we will therefore
analyse whether EU policies have been compartmentalised and/or securitised.
We analyse the nexus between security and democracy, security and development
and security and humanitarian aid respectively.
Security–democracy nexus
EU policies in the security and democracy areas were largely compartmentalised.
There were some attempts to establish links, but this was very limited. For
example, a small part of the justice reform programme was meant to address impu-
nity in eastern Chad. The PRAJUST programme aims to ﬁnance mobile courts in
the east with the aim of making justice actors return to the east. In this way, the pro-
gramme builds on the UN mandate establishing MINURCAT.72 In the security
sphere, some efforts were made to ensure that Chadian security forces effectively
provided security for citizens and goods and respected democratic governance.
Indeed, within the PAFSI programme, human rights deontology was included in
the training of the Police Nationale, Gendarmerie Nationale and Garde Nationale et
Nomade du Tchad.73 Moreover, a close coordination with justice sector reform, the
Ministry of Human Rights and human rights organisations was sought.74 Still,
an EU ofﬁcial confessed that these initiatives are only “peanuts” that may be
good for communication but do not contribute to justice reform.75 The compart-
mentalisation of democracy and security policies can be explained by the division
of responsibilities in both areas: whereas the political dialogue was seen as “the
baby of the EC delegation” in N’Djamena, the preparation of the EUFOR
mission in the eastern part of Chad was primarily done in Brussels and Paris.76
We can clearly see that security considerations have been prioritised over democ-
racy promotion. The EUFOR mission mainly aimed at achieving stability and
security. It was largely designed as separate from the internal political crisis in
Chad, despite the obvious interconnectedness between the security situation and
Chad’s political crisis (see supra). EUFOR ofﬁcers were speciﬁcally instructed not
to talk to the Chadian rebels and could not intervene in the political problems in
the country.77 In this way, the mission reﬂected the interests of France. The
French government’s main objective was to achieve stability in Chad,78 and a con-
tinuation of the Déby government was considered as the best way to achieve this
72. European Commission, “ Décision de la Commission sur le Programme d’action annuel 2008 en
faveur de la République du Tchad à ﬁnancer sur les ressources du 10eme Fonds Européen de Dévelop-
pement—Action Fiches ”, available: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2008/af_aap_2008_
tcd.pdf> (accessed 30 April 2012).
73. European Commission, “Commission Decision of 28/07/2010”, op. cit., p. 3.
74. European Commission, “Commission Decision of 28/07/2010”, op. cit., p. 2.
75. Interview 8, 11 May 2012.
76. Interview 5, 19 April 2012.
77. Chafer, op. cit., p. 79.
78. See Mattelaer, op. cit., p. 14, quoting a French diplomat: “What we want in Chad is stability”.
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aim. This should also be seen in the context of the geopolitical situation. The West
has tried to isolate Khartoum, which gives President Déby the opportunity to
present himself as “the good guy”.79 A high-ranked ofﬁcial at the EU conﬁrms
the view that stability was the EU’s main concern and that democracy-related con-
siderations were subordinated to this. He argues that “stability was not possible
without Déby” and that the 2010 election, despite its obvious ﬂaws, needed to be
endorsed “in the name of stability”.80 Other EU member states supported an EU
initiative because they wanted “to do something related to Darfur” and “some-
thing for the ESDP” or because of speciﬁc domestic considerations.81
As a result, there has arguably been some ambiguity as to the relationship
between the military mission and the objective of democratic governance. On the
one hand there was clear French support for the Déby government against the
armed opposition even until early 2008. On the other hand the French-instigated
EUFOR mission claimed to be neutral and impartial. In any case, the EUFOR
mission had the effect of consolidating Déby’s power as its mandate to create a
safe and secure environment had an effect of “humanitarian deterrence”.82 Orig-
inally, the UN had come up with a plan for a mission that would include civilian,
police and military components. The civilian component would include the rule of
law, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian liaison and public information.83 The
Chadian government was however unfavourable to such a comprehensive mission
which it feared would threaten its position. In order to be acceptable for the
Chadian government, the EUFOR mission had a more security and humanitarian
oriented mandate.84 Another example supporting the securitisation scenario is
the case of the investigation of the disappearance of the opposition candidate
Mahamat Saleh in 2006. After pressure in the French parliament on the issue, the
French and the EU pushed for the establishment of an investigation committee,
which found that the security forces were complicit and the Chadian government
had done little to prevent this. However, none of the actors involved truly followed
up on the report in terms of diplomatic action.85 A democracy-ﬁrst approach would
have implied that the EU would engage in tackling the root causes of conﬂict by
making sure that all opposition groups are represented in the political system.
However, the EU only pushed for dialogue with the non-armed opposition,
which led to the August 2007 political agreement.86
Security–development nexus
The EUFOR’s mandate centred on stability and security and did not aim to directly
intermesh with developmental considerations. In 2006 an informal division of
labour between the security and development spheres of the EU emerged: while
79. Interview 1, 19 March 2009.
80. Interview 8, 11 May 2012.
81. Interview 4, 16 April 2012; Styan, op. cit., p. 657; Benjamin Pohl, “To What Ends? Governmental
Interests and European Union (Non-)Intervention in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo”,
Cooperation and Conﬂict, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2014), pp. 191–211.
82. Interview 4, 16 April 2012; Mattelaer, op. cit., pp. 26–28; Chafer, op. cit.
83. Mattelaer, op. cit., pp. 8–9.
84. Interview 4, 16 April 2012.
85. Richard Moncrieff, “French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa under President Sarkozy”, SAIIA
Occasional Paper No 107 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2012), p. 35.
86. Interview 4, 16 April 2012.
The European Union’s “Comprehensive Approach” in Chad 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
en
t] 
at 
12
:43
 06
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
EUFOR’s activities concerned the east of Chad, the EC Delegation focused more on
other parts of the country.87 Seibert reports that, during the EUFOR mission,
cooperation between development policies under the responsibility of the Commis-
sion Delegation and the military in the form of EUFOR was “largely elusive” and
“limited at best”, and that the nomination of an EU special representative (EUSR),
MrTorben Brylle, did not improve cooperation because “hewas seen as an additional
extension of the Council Secretariat at the expense of the EU Commission”.88 Simi-
larly, Helly talks about “disappointingly sub-optimal” cooperation between themili-
tary staff and theCommission.89According toWittebroodandGadrey90 this situation
has its origins in the planning phase of the EUFOR operation which was “largely
driven by the European Council”while the Commission’s role was limited. Develop-
ment-related projects by EUFOR were limited to about €2.2 million.91
Although it is clear that an increasing amount of EU funds has gone to security,
this did not mean that funds were diverted away from economic development.
Rather, the overall envelope of development assistance for Chad was increased
which allowed for a more comprehensive approach without reducing funds for
development objectives. Given that the A envelope of the EDF, which includes pro-
grammable aid, increased by almost one-third, the amount spent on development
did not decrease.92 In 2002–2007, the A envelope was €202 million, of which 9% or
€18 million was foreseen for governance and €184 for development (transport,
water, macro-economic support). However, in 2008–2013, the A envelope increased
to €299 million, of which 32–36% or €99 million would go to governance and €200
to development (transport, rural development, health, technical support). Support
for the security sector was further ﬁnanced by the Instrument for Stability, which is
speciﬁcally designed to ﬁnance security-related activities.
Security–humanitarian aid nexus
The relationship between the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission and the Commission’s
humanitarian aid ofﬁce has been more intensive than that with the development
aid counterpart, but it has equally also been more openly conﬂicting. From the
outset EUFORwas confronted with mistrust by the humanitarian aid scene consist-
ing of international NGOs but also the Commission’s ECHO.93 The latter was par-
ticularly hesitant about the political dynamics behind the mission, which was
perceived to be motivated by French security interests and put too much emphasis
on the visibility and measurable results in terms of IDP returns.94
87. Interviews 5 and 6, 19 April 2012.
88. Björn H. Seibert, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union’s Common Security and
Defense Policy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), pp. 61–63.
89. Damien Helly, “The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African
Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA)”, in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane
(eds.), European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years (1999–2009) (Paris: The European Union
Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p. 343.
90. Wittebrood and Gadrey, op. cit., p. 259.
91. Seibert, op. cit., p. 107.
92. Interview Sergio Scuero, see p. 58 , available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/
reportage%20vol1_chapter3_chad%20-%20boosting%20security%20in%20refugee%20camps.pdf>
(accessed 30 April 2012).
93. Morazán et al., op. cit., p. 27.
94. Interview 3, 19 April 2012; Wittebrood and Gadrey, op. cit., p. 262.
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There are no indications that a securitisation of the EU’s humanitarian aid has
taken place in Chad. Humanitarian aid budgets seem to be in line with a needs-
based approach, and despite pressure from EUFOR to do more in the east, the
level of assistance provided to the refugee camps did not change.95 In addition,
the relationship between the military and humanitarian spheres gradually
improved over the summer of 2008,96 allegedly because the EUFOR Commander
(Mr Ganascia, a French national) started to take their concerns into account.97
From then onwards EUFOR focused more clearly on humanitarian concerns and
abandoned the temptation to measure success by counting IDP returns.98 This evol-
ution can be seen as a victory for the humanitarian aid community, including the
Commission’s DG ECHO, which managed to preserve the humanitarian principles
in the face of initial opposition from the military sphere.99 Despite the fact that the
security situation in Chad has improved, the budget for humanitarian assistance
has not decreased, and has even increased in recent years.100 Growing food insecur-
ity in the Sahel and refugee ﬂows from Libya and the Central African Republic can
explain this increase.101
Conclusions
This paper has sought to address the nexus between the EU’s security, democracy
promotion and development policies, as well as humanitarian assistance in Chad
from 2006 to the present. Whereas EU policies in Chad were largely dominated
by development and humanitarian assistance until the mid-2000s, from 2006
onwards the EU has embarked on other areas including security and democracy
promotion. First of all, this study addressed the question whether the EU’s compre-
hensive approach supersedes the compartmentalisation of the EU’s political
system. We found that policies in different areas were largely conducted separately
from one another. As regards the military mission EUFOR, we noticed a strong
degree of mistrust from the development and humanitarian community, although
cooperation with the latter improved signiﬁcantly. Attempts to integrate security
and democratic governance policies were rather tentative. Secondly, the study
asked the question whether a comprehensive approach has led to a securitisation
of EU policies. Interestingly, while we found clear evidence of a securitisation of
democracy promotion, we did not ﬁnd development policy or humanitarian aid
to be securitised. The EUFOR mission had the effect (intended by France and toler-
ated by other member states) of strengthening an authoritarian regime and over-
shadowing democracy promotion efforts. In contrast, while we had expected
security issues to dominate over the EU’s development cooperation and
95. Interview 5, 19 April 2012.
96. See also Seibert, op. cit., pp. 63–64; Helly, op. cit., pp. 344–345; Wittebrood and Gadrey, op. cit.,
p. 265.
97. Interview 3, 3 April 2012.
98. Interview 5, 19 April 2012.
99. Wittebrood and Gadrey, op. cit., p. 265.
100. Financing decisions available on website DG ECHO: European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid
and Civil Protection Department, “Financing decisions (HIPs) 2015”, <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-
evaluations/funding-decisions-hips_en>.
101. Interview 7, 3 May 2012; European Commission, “ Humanitarian Implementation Plan ”, op. cit.
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humanitarian assistance, it seems that activities were not reduced in either of these
areas, despite some pressure from the EUFOR mission to refocus activities on the
east.
While the securitisation of democracy promotion could be expected on the basis
of previous studies,102 the non-securitisation of development and humanitarian
assistance is rather surprising. The dominance of security over democracy can be
explained by the particular role of France, which has strong links with the govern-
ment of President Déby. Furthermore, the EU is confronted with the “lack of an
alternative”, namely a fragmented opposition and a weak civil society, making it
difﬁcult to support democracy bottom-up. Democracy assistance has proven par-
ticularly sensitive in the case of Chad, and the EU is shown to have very limited
leverage vis-à-vis the government which has access to oil revenues.103 Develop-
ment policy is less likely to be abandoned than democracy promotion, given the
“pressure to spend” and the fact that development assistance is mostly well
received by developing countries while democracy assistance is often seen as intru-
sive in internal affairs.104 In the case of the EU, democracy promotion is a relatively
new policy area, which has often led to the EU taking a more technocratic or devel-
opmental approach.105 In the case of humanitarian aid we saw that ECHOwas par-
ticularly strong in emphasising its autonomy.
Notwithstanding earlier publications and fears from NGOs suggesting that the
EU’s development policies have become securitised, the case of Chad did not
conﬁrm this scenario. This is surprising given the fact that security was a key
issue in this case, given the large security mission and instability in the country
and region, and the French interests involved. Hence, it can be expected that this
conclusion can be generalised to other cases where security objectives are less
important. While security features increasingly on the EU’s agenda towards devel-
oping countries, our ﬁndings suggest that this does not necessarily lead to securi-
tisation in the sense that funds are being diverted or development or humanitarian
initiatives are being used for security purposes. As far as the securitisation of demo-
cratic governance is concerned, this was expected given Chad’s strategic impor-
tance. Also our ﬁnding on the continuing compartmentalisation is less
generalisable to other countries.
In any case, further systematic and comparative research would be needed to
analyse the interplay between security, development, humanitarian and democracy
promotion policies . The EU has recently stepped up its efforts to reach a compre-
hensive approach to security with a Joint Communication by the European Com-
mission and EEAS on this topic, but democratic governance has been
understated in this document. Our analysis makes clear that, while fears voiced
by the NGO community of a securitisation of aid may be overstated, there is an
urgent need to take democracy related objectives more seriously as part of a com-
prehensive approach.
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